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Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote
is This, Anyway?
R. Lawrence Dessem*
In recent years Members of the United States Congress have
brought suit against the executive branch of the federal government with
growing frequency. As early as 1978, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit noted: "An increasing number of
congressmen and senators are repairing to the courts, either instead of,
or after, resorting to the political process, to challenge executive actions
and policies. Such cases, because of their almost inevitable political
overtones, present the courts with some very difficult jurisdictional ques-
tions."1 These "difficult jurisdictional questions" are the subject of this
article.
The article is divided into three major sections. Section I traces the
development of a separate doctrine of "congressional standing." It ex-
amines the doctrine's development from the Supreme Court's initial con-
sideration of legislative standing through the current opinions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Sec-
tion II then analyzes three possible theories of congressional injury and
standing. Derivative, representative, and third-party standing theories
are all rejected as a basis for congressional standing. While rejecting the
suggestion that congressmen possess a personal interest in "their" votes
sufficient to constitute the "distinct and palpable injury" 2 required for
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1973, Macalester
College;J.D., 1976, Harvard University. As an attorney with the United States Department ofJus-
tice, the author represented the executive branch in two of the cases cited in this article: Cranston v.
Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1985), and Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981),
vacated sub nom., NOW, Inc. v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
1 Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461,465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (citation
omitted). See also Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F. 2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985), stating that, "It has become
a growing phenomenom to see individual members of Congress challenge actions or failures to act
as violations of the members' interests as legislators." Indeed, in 1973 Senator Walter Mondale
acknowledged "a greater awareness on the part of Members of the Congress-and the American
people--of the dangers of illegal executive branch actions, and the potential of court challenges as a
means ofcorrecting such illegality." 119 CONG. REc. 33,796 (1973). AsJudge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
has noted, these congressional plaintiffs have included both "liberal" and "conservative" legislators.
Ginsburg, InvitingJudicialActivisim: A 'Liberal' or 'Conservative' Technique?, 15 GA. L. REv. 539, 541-42
(1981).
These lawsuits also have sparked commentary in legal journals. See McGowan, Congressmen in
Court. The New Plaintffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981); Note, The Justiciabililty of Congressional-Plaintiff
Suits, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1982); Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HAav.
J. ON LEGIs. 352 (1974); Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1632 (1977);
Note, The Burger Court's Unified Approach to Standing and its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. Rav. 1187 (1985); Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665 (1974);
Comment, Standing Versus Justiciability: Recent Developments in Participatory Suits Brought by Congressional
Plaintiffs, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371 (1982); Comment, Standingfor State and Federal Legislators, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 811 (1983); Comment, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive Action, 122 U. PA. L.
REv. 1366 (1974).
2 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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article III standing purposes, the article finds that truly direct injury to an
individual Member of Congress is a proper predicate for congressional
standing. Section III next considers the circumstances under which the
Congress, as an institution, might possess standing and concludes that
suits initiated by Congress would not suffer from the same deficiencies as
do suits brought by its individual Members. Accordingly, this section of
the article concludes that, in appropriate circumstances, the courts
should recognize the standing of the Congress to sue the Executive.
The Supreme Court has recognized that in determining the standing
to sue of private plaintiffs, "No principle is more fundamental to thejudi-
ciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." 3
This same constitutional limitation, and concern, is heightened when the
standing to sue of a congressman, rather than of a private person, is at
issue. Accordingly, resolution of the issue of congressional standing re-
quires an examination of the "proper role" of both the courts and the
Congress in "our system of government."
I. The Development of a Separate Doctrine of
"Congressional Standing"
A. The Supreme Court's Initial Consideration of Legislative Standing
With increasing frequency in recent years, the Supreme Court has
addressed the standing to sue of private plaintiffs. 4 The Court has held
that "[t]he concept of standing is part of [an article III constitutional]
limitation," 5 the standing question in all cases being "whether the plain-
tiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.' 6 The Court also
has stressed that "[t]he nature of the injury is central to the Art. III in-
quiry, because standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of
those most likely to be affected by a judicial decision. ' '7
The Supreme Court recently summarized the article III standing re-
quirements as follows:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes
the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some ac-
tual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
3 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
4 E.g., Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
5 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
6 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)). Justice Scalia has described standing somewhat more colorfully as follows: "In more pedes-
trian terms, it is an answer to the very first question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person
complains of another's actions: 'What's it to you?' " Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFroLu U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983).
7 Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 (1986).
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the defendant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged ac-
tion' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976).8
Despite the large number of recent cases in which the Supreme
Court has addressed the standing doctrine, it has never directly consid-
ered the circumstances under which a Member of Congress possesses
standing to sue in his or her official capacity.9 However, in its 1939 deci-
sion in Coleman v. Miller the Court did consider the standing to sue of
state legislators. 10
The Coleman case involved a dispute over the authority of the Lieu-
tenant Governor of Kansas to cast the tie-breaking vote on a resolution
for the ratification of a proposed child labor amendment to the United
States Constitution. The Coleman plaintiffs consisted of the twenty mem-
bers of the Kansas Senate who had voted against the resolution." The
Kansas Supreme Court upheld both the Lieutenant Governor's authority
to cast the deciding vote and the validity of the resolution itself.'2
The United States Supreme Court's subsequent consideration of the
case produced an "Opinion of the Court" authored by Chief Justice
Hughes which only two other justices joined. In this opinion, the Chief
Justice concluded that at least the twenty senators who had voted against
the resolution had standing to challenge its purported ratification by
8 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982), quoted in Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697, 1707-08 (1986).
9 The Court, however, has granted certiorari in a case which presents the issue of congressional
standing. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 106 S.
Ct. 1258 (1986). While the issue of congressional standing has been raised in several other cases
decided by the Supreme Court, the Court has never directly addressed the issue.
In some of the cases in which congressional standing has been raised, the Supreme Court simply
did not address the standing of the congressional plaintiffs. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (mem.) (court of appeals' decision upholding standing of congressional plaintiffs to challenge
the termination of a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China vacated, but none of the four
separate opinions addressed congressional standing); Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73, 75 n.2 (1973) (because standing of plaintiff congressmen was not reached by court of
appeals, issue was not presented to, or considered by, Supreme Court).
In other cases, the Supreme Court has merely affirmed, without opinion, lower court decisions
dismissing actions brought by congressional plaintiffs on standing grounds. In McClure v. Carter,
513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), af'd merm., 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), a three-judge court ruled that Senator
James McClure was without standing to challenge the appointment of Abner Mikva as a federal
judge. In Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 434 U.S. 1028
(1978), a three-judge court held that a congressman had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of two federal pay raises, but ruled against him on the merits. In a separate concurrence to the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the lower court in Pressler, Justice Rehnquist stated: "Our 'unexpli-
cated affirmance' without opinion could rest as readily on our conclusion that appellant lacked stand-
ing to litigate the merits of the question as it could on agreement with the District Court's resolution
of the merits of the question." 434 U.S. at 1029.
Finally, on at least two recent occasions, the Supreme Court has considered actions brought by
legislators challenging their exclusion from the legislative bodies to which they had been elected.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). In both of these
cases the legislative bodies in question (the United States House of Representatives and the Georgia
House of Representatives) refused to seat the plaintiffs or pay them legislative salaries. In neither
case was the legislator's standing to sue addressed by the Supreme Court.
10 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
11 Id. at 435-36.
12 Id. at 436-37.
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Kansas.13 The Chief Justice reasoned: "Here, the plaintiffs include
twenty senators, whose votes against ratification have been overridden
and virtually held for naught although, if they are right in their conten-
tions, their votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification. We
think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes."' 14
Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion in which Justices Roberts,
Black, and Douglas joined, asserted that the state legislators were with-
out standing to sue.- 5 Justice Frankfurter argued that the state senators
had no "specialized interest of their own to vindicate" in the lawsuit.' 6
Instead, he asked, "What is their distinctive claim to be here, not pos-
sessed by every Kansan? . . . In no repect ... do [plaintiffs'] objections
relate to any secular interest that pertains to these Kansas legislators
apart from interests that belong to the entire commonality of Kansas."117
Justice Frankfurter also distinguished precedents involving the votes
of private citizens, concluding that "a voter's franchise is a personal
right, assessable in money damages," while the votes of elected officials
''pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives
executing the legislative process."' 8 Accordingly, because Frankfurter
believed the Court should "leave intra-parliamentary controversies to
parliaments and outside the scrutiny of law courts,"1 9 he concluded that
the Kansas legislators were without standing to sue.
Coleman's authority as precedent for modem congressional standing
cases is problematic. Neither Chief Justice Hughes nor Justice Frank-
furter mustered a majority of the Court in support of their respective
opinions. Moreover, Colemen dealt with the standing to sue of state legis-
lators rather than of Members of Congress. 20 Furthermore, the Coleman
plaintiffs included every state senator who had voted against the child
labor resolution, and the votes of these senators, if plaintiffs' legal theory
was correct, would have been sufficient to defeat the adoption of the res-
olution. Quite different concerns may, and should, apply in actions
13 Id. at 446.
14 Id. at 438. However, after concluding that the senators had standing to sue, the ChiefJus-
tice's opinion did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claims because of the political question doctrine.
Id. at 446-56.
15 Id at 460-70. In addition to this separate opinion which explicitly addressed standing, im-
plicit in Justice Butler's dissent (in which Justice McReynolds joined) is the presumption that the
legislators possessed standing to sue. Id. at 470-74.
16 Id. at 464.
17 Id. In an aside Justice Frankfurter also opined that, if the Kansas legislators were found to
have standing, "[b]y as much right could a member of the Congress who had voted against the
passage of a bill because moved by constitutional scruples urge before this Court our duty to con-
sider his arguments of unconstitutionality." Id. at 465.
18 Id. at 469, 470.
19 Id. at 469.
20 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has distinguished
Coleman from congressional standing cases as follows:
The major distinguishing factor between Coleman and the present case lies in the fact that
the plaintiffs in Coleman were state legislators. A separation of powers issue arises as soon as
the Coleman holding is extended to United States legislators. If a federal court decides a
case brought by a United States legislator, it risks interfering with the proper affairs of a co-
equal branch.
Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204-05 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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brought by individual congressmen who cannot even convince their fel-
low legislators of the correctness of their cause.21
Despite the weaknesses of Coleman as a judicial precedent, the case
represents the Supreme Court's only specific consideration of legislative
standing. Thus, after Coleman the lower federal courts were left to grap-
ple with the issue of congressional standing to sue.
B. The Initial Congressional Standing Decisions In The Lower Federal Courts
Despite the acceptance of legislative standing by Chief Justice
Hughes in Coleman, it was not until the early 1970's that congressmen
attempted to resort to the federal courts in significant numbers. The ini-
tial congressional lawsuits challenged miscellaneous actions of the execu-
tive branch. 22 However, the issue that served as the catalyst for the
growing number of such lawsuits was American military involvement in
Southeast Asia.
Indeed, lawsuits challenging the legality of American involvement in
Southeast Asia resulted in consideration of congressional standing by
three separate United States courts of appeals. 23 In two of these cases
the plaintiff congressmen were found to lack standing.24 The third deci-
sion recognized congressional standing but provided only a short-lived
precedent even in the circuit in which it was decided.25 However, the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Mitchell v. Laird is instructive, for it represents perhaps the
broadest appellate construction of congressional standing to sue.
In Mitchell v. Laird the court of appeals upheld the standing of thir-
teen Members of Congress to challenge the constitutionality of the
United States' involvement in Southeast Asia. The Court found congres-
sional standing because the declaratory judgment sought "would bear
upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether to impeach defendants,
and upon plaintiffs' quite distinct and different duties to make appropria-
tions to support the hostilities, or to take other legislative actions related
to such hostilities .... 26
The District of Columbia Circuit soon expressly disapproved Mitch-
21 See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 105-06 (D.D.C. 1973) (congressmen held to have
standing to seek judicial declaration concerning legality of the dismissal of the Watergate Special
Prosecutor); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 263-64 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (congressman held to
lack standing to challenge allotment by Environmental Protection Agency of federal water pollution
control funds); Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-66 (D.D.C. 1973) (senators held to have
standing to challenge legality of individual serving as acting director of Office of Economic Opportu-
nity). See also State Highway Comm'n of Mo. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1099 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973)
(amicus brief submitted on behalf of congressmen in action challenging impoundment of federal
highway funds).
23 Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F.
Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
24 Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484
F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973).
25 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26 488 F.2d at 614. The court of appeals nevertheless found the case to be nonjusticiable be-
cause it presented a political question. 488 F.2d at 616.
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ell's broad theory of congressional standing in Harrington v. Bush. 2 7
Rather than Mitchell v. Laird,28 it was the subsequent decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Kennedy v. Sampson 29 that became the seminal case on congressional
standing.
C. Kennedy v. Sampson and its progeny
While not the first judicial decision recognizing legislative standing,
the 1974 decision of Kennedy v. Sampson30 soon became the leading con-
gressional standing case within both the District of Columbia Circuit and
the other federal appellate circuits generally.3 1 Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy brought the case in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia to challenge an attempted "pocket veto" by President
Nixon of a bill for which Senator Kennedy had voted.32 Although Sena-
tor Kennedy sued in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, as well as in
his capacity as a senator, neither the district court nor the court of ap-
peals considered his asserted standing as either a citizen or a taxpayer. 33
Instead, both courts held that Senator Kennedy had standing to sue as an
individual Member of Congress.3 4
27 553 F.2d 190, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974), the congressional standing case decided by the D.C. Circuit one year after Mitchell, the court
of appeals did not even cite Mitchell, despite the fact that both the district court and the congres-
sional plaintiff in Kennedy had explicitly relied upon the earlier decision. See Harrington v. Bush, 553
F.2d 190, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson, 364 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (D.D.C. 1973).
Moreover, bothJudge Tamm, who wrote for the Kennedy panel, and ChiefJudge Bazelon were on the
appellate panel that had decided Mitchell v. Laird. In addition to this treatment in the District of
Columbia Circuit, the two other United States courts of appeals which have considered the congres-
sional standing rationale adopted in Mitchell have refused to adopt such reasoning. Harrington v.
Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d
Cir. 1973).
28 See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
29 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
30 Id.
31 While the majority of the congressional standing cases have been brought and decided in the
District of Columbia Circuit, some congressional plaintiffs have brought suit in other judicial cir-
cuits. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986); Harrington v.
Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d
Cir. 1973); McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho), aff'd sub. nom., McClure v. Reagan, 454
U.S. 1025 (1981) (mem.); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 263-264 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See
also Drummond v. Bunker, 560 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1977) (members of Congress intervened in action
concerning Panama Canal negotiations; standing issue not reached by the court).
In addition to the above congressional actions, federal judicial circuits other than the District of
Columbia Circuit have decided cases concerning the standing to sue of state legislators. Dennis v.
Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 630-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1277-78 (5th Cir.
1975); Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1116-21 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated on other grounds sub
nom., NOW, Inc. v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1297-98 (N.D. IIl.
1975); Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575, 576 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See also Colorado General
Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508, 515-16 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Wilt v. Beal, 26 Pa. Commw. 298,
363 A.2d 876, 878-881 (1976).
However, even in those congressional and legislative standing cases decided outside the District
of Columbia Circuit, that circuit's decision in Kennedy v. Sampson has been cited and followed. See,
e.g., Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d at 459; Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1118-20; McClure
v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. at 270.
32 364 F. Supp. 1075 (D.D.C. 1973).
33 364 F. Supp. at 1077-79; 511 F.2d at 433.
34 364 F. Supp. at 1079; 511 F.2d at 433.
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In affirming the district court's standing decision, the court of ap-
peals relied upon Coleman v. Miller.35 However, in contrast to Coleman,
where all twenty senators who had voted against the challenged resolu-
tion brought suit, Senator Kennedy was the sole plaintiff who sued con-
cerning the attempted pocket veto. The court of appeals explicitly noted
that Senator Kennedy "ha[d] not been authorized to prosecute this suit
on behalf of the Senate or the Congress."'3 6 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that article III standing requirements were satisfied by Senator
Kennedy's assertion that the attempted pocket veto had "nullified" his
vote in favor of the legislation in question.3 7 While recognizing that any
interest of, or injury to, Senator Kennedy was merely "derivative" of that
of the Congress, the court nevertheless concluded that "the office of
United States Senator does confer a participation in the power of the
Congress which is exercised by a Senator when he votes for or against
proposed legislation. ' '3 8
Three years after its decision in Kennedy v. Sampson the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit again faced the issue of con-
gressional standing in Harrington v. Bush.39 In this lawsuit, Congressman
Harrington challenged certain activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency and asserted that such activities had injured him as a congress-
man in connection with the impeachment, appropriations, and general
lawmaking powers of Congress. The Court of Appeals, however, refused
to follow its earlier decision in Mitchell v. Laird. It instead concluded that
even though the declaratory judgment sought by Congressman Harring-
ton would "bear upon" his congressional duties, he nevertheless lacked
standing to sue.40
In reaching this conclusion, the Harrington court asserted that "there
are no special standards for determining congressional standing ques-
tions."'4 ' The court rejected the Congressman's argument that he en-
joyed a "special relationship" to the legislative process that was
significant for standing purposes. The court concluded that "[t]here is
no doubt that, as a Congressman, appellant occupies a special relation-
ship to the legislative process. This relationship, however, merely de-
fines his power to act in the process, not the impact of any illegality on
his Congressional status." 42
35 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
36 511 F.2dat433.
37 Id.
38 511 F.2d at 436. In a separate concurrence Judges Fahy and Bazelon agreed that Senator
Kennedy had standing, stating that the senator "represents a sovereign state whose people have a
deep interest in the Act and look to their Senators to protect that interest" and that he possessed "a
legal right" to seek to protect "his own interest as a national legislator in the bill for which he
voted." 511 F.2d at 446.
39 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The year after its decision in Kennedy the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit decided two cases in which it found the congressional plaintiffs without
standing to sue. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Sampson, No. 74-1619 (D.C. Cir. June 16, 1975); Stokes v.
General Servs. Admin., No. 74-1886 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 1975). However, neither of these cases was
officially reported. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d at 194 n.4.
40 553 F.2d at 207-210.
41 553 F.2d at 214.
42 553 F.2d at 211. The court of appeals' delimitation of any "special relationship" between a
congressman and the legislative process was analogous to the rejection of congressional standing in
19861
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The court also narrowly limited its prior decision in Kennedy v. Samp-
son. Rather than recognizing congressional standing to challenge the le-
gality of executive branch actions undertaken subsequent to the
enactment of a law, the Harrington court interpreted the "Kennedy para-
digm" as "rel[ying] on nullification of a specific vote as the requisite in-
jury in fact." 43 Accordingly, the court denied Congressman Harrington
standing to sue because his "votes ha[d] not been nullified or diminished
in force because of the [alleged] post-enactment illegality" 44 and because
the court refused to recognize "an impairment of future unspecified
votes" as sufficient injury for article III standing purposes. 45
Two years after Harrington the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Goldwater v.
Carter.46 In the court's per curiam opinion, a majority of the judges con-
cluded that the plaintiff senators and representatives possessed standing
to challenge the President's unilateral termination of a Mutual Defense
Treaty with the Republic of China.47 The "crucial fact" leading the ma-
jority to find standing was "that... there [was] no conceivable senatorial
McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
In McRae, several congressman who had voted in favor of a statute sought to intervene in a judicial
action in which the constitutionality of that statute was challenged. The district court found the
congressmen without standing to sue because they had had their "vote[s] counted at [their] full legal
value." 421 F. Supp. at 540. The court explained its ruling as follows: "To grant intervention on
the ground of the members' participation in enacting the law would involve accepting as a principle
that each member of the Congress has an interest to intervene in every case in which the substantive
constitutionality of a provision in a federal enactment was drawn into question, or indeed, in which
the interpretation of a federal statute was in question." Id.
43 553 F.2d at 211. The Harrington court also reaffirmed the theory of "derivative injury"
adopted in Kennedy v. Sampson. While recognizing that Representative Harrington had not been au-
thorized to prosecute any legal action, the court of appeals concluded that indirect, or derivative,
injury was sufficient to establish congressional standing. Id. at 199 n.41. However, the court further
concluded that Congress, itself, had not been injured and that therefore Congressman Harrington
could not suffer injury derivatively. Id. at 200 n.41.
44 Id. at 213.
45 Id. at 211. On the same day that it issued its opinion in Harrington, the court of appeals also
decided another congressional standing case. Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, id. at 176
(D.C. Cir. 1977). In this second case the court relied upon Harrington in finding insufficient Senator
Metcalf's injuries premised upon the alleged "nullification" of past votes and his own uncertainty as
to "how best to take effective legislative action to correct the illegalities he perceive[d]." Id. at 185.
Although Senator Metcalf tried to distinguish himself from Representative Harrington by also suing
in his capacity as the chairman of a Senate subcommittee, the court found it to be insignificant that
he had alleged injuries "relate[d] to his legislative responsibility in a specific subject area and on a
specific committee." Id. at 188. The court concluded that Senator Metcalf lacked standing to sue
because "[iut is the injury which must be specific, not merely the interest on which the injury has been
inflicted." Id.
46 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir) (per curiam) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). Subse-
quent to its decision in Harrington, but prior to its decision in Goldwater, the court of appeals decided
three other cases in which congressional plaintiffs challenged actions of the executive branch. Reuss
v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d
1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 907 (1978). In Renss and Daughtrey the court of appeals found the congressional plaintiffs to be
without standing to sue, while in Edwards v. Carter the court recognized the question presented con-
cerning plaintiffs' standing but nevertheless "proceed[ed] directly to the merits of [the] case" with-
out addressing that issue. 580 F.2d at 1056-57.
47 617 F.2d at 701-03. In addition to the judges who joined the per curiam majority, in his sepa-
rate dissentJudge MacKinnon also concluded that the congressional plaintiffs possessed standing to
sue. Id. at 716.
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action that could likely prevent termination of the Treaty."'48 Accord-
ingly, the majority held that the congressional plaintiffs possessed stand-
ing to sue based upon a "complete nullification or withdrawal of a voting
opportunity." 49
ChiefJudge Skelly Wright authored a separate concurrence in which
he argued that the congressional plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.50
Judge Wright asserted that, under Kennedy v. Sampson, an individual con-
gressman could not establish derivative injury unless the Congress, as a
whole, had been injured. Because "a majority of Congress [had not] spo-
ken unequivocally" concerning termination of the treaty, neither Con-
gress, nor any individual congressman, possessed standing to sue.5 1
While the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' Goldwater de-
cision, 52 none of the separate Supreme Court opinions in that case ad-
dressed the issue of congressional standing. Thus, two years later in the
case of Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee,53 the District of Columbia
Circuit itself attempted to reconcile its various congressional standing
cases and their often divergent rationales.
D. The District of Columbia Circuit's "Equitable Discretion" Doctrine
Concern with perceived contradictions in its congressional standing
cases led the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to adopt a doctrine of "circumscribed equitable discretion" in its
1981 decision in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee.54 The court
found "[t]wo contradictory principles" in its earlier standing decisions:
First, no distinctions are to be made between congressional and pri-
vate plaintiffs in the standing analysis.... Second, this court will not
confer standing on a congressional plaintiff unless he is suffering an
injury that his colleagues cannot redress.55
In an effort to resolve this asserted contradiction, while recognizing
the separation of powers issues posed by congressional lawsuits, the
Riegle court held that "[w]hen a congressional plaintiff brings a suit in-
volving circumstances in which legislative redress is not available or a pri-
48 Id. at 703.
49 Id. at 702.
50 Id. at 709.
51 Id. at 712. Judge Wright also separately addressed the "prudential aspect of the standing
doctrine" and suggested that this aspect of standing also cautioned against entertaining the con-
gressmen's lawsuit. Id. at 715.
52 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
53 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
54 Id. In opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit subsequent
to Riegle, "the name of the new doctrine [changed] from 'circumscribed equitable discretion'. . . to
'remedial discretion.'" United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1381
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In fact,judges of the court of appeals have "use[d] the terms interchangeably."
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
779 (1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
55 656 F.2d at 877. In contrast to the second of these "contradictory principles" is the court of
appeals' earlier decision in Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, in which the court rejected the sug-
gestion that "merely because appellant can pursue an alternative remedy in the legislative process,
he has suffered no injury." 553 F.2d 176, 189 n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, the Metcalf court
reasoned that the existence of "undiminished powers" to function as a senator established that the
plaintiff "[had] suffered no specific, demonstrable injury in his capacity as a senator." Id.
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vate plaintiff would likely not qualify for standing, the court would be
counseled under our standard to hear the case." 56 Thus, despite finding
that Senator Riegle satisfied traditional standing requirements, the court
of appeals nevertheless dismissed his case because of its further conclu-
sion that 'judicial action would improperly interfere with the legislative
process." 57
In adopting such a doctrine of equitable discretion, however, the
Riegle court did not focus on the fact that it is difficult to imagine situa-
tions in which some form of "legislative redress" is not available to a
plaintiff congressman. 58 Moreover, the court failed to adequately explain
the significance of a private individual's inability to bring suit for its deci-
sion to entertain a suit brought by a congressman.59
Despite such conceptual problems with its new equitable discretion
doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit continued to apply that doctrine in the increasing number of con-
gressional standing cases presented to it.60 In VanderJagt v. O'Neill,61 the
court applied this doctrine to a suit challenging the distribution of com-
mittee assignments within the House of Representatives brought by Re-
publican congressmen against the Democratic House leadership. The
court held that the congressional plaintiffs had standing based upon their
allegation "that the Democratic House leadership has successfully di-
luted the political power of Republican representatives, their voters, and
residents of their districts." 62 The court, however, applied the doctrine
of equitable discretion and affirmed the dismissal of the action.63
The majority opinion in VanderJagt precipitated a lengthy concur-
56 656 F.2d at 882. In adopting this standard, the court of appeals relied primarily upon a law
review article by Judge Carl McGowan, in which he had suggested that subsequent to the Supreme
Court's decision in Goldwater v. Carter the separation of powers issues posed by congressional law-
suits should not be addressed within the contours of traditional standing doctrine. See McGowan,
Congressmen in Court: The New Plainti/Is, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981).
57 656 F.2d at 882.
58 For instance, in Kennedy v. Sampson, Senator Kennedy could have attempted to convince the
Congress to pass new legislation identical to the bill which President Nixon had attempted to veto.
Instead of recognizing this fact, the Riegle court merely attempted to distinguish Kennedy as involving
"certain acts of the executive not subject to direct legislative redress." 656 F.2d at 882 (emphasis
added).
59 The court of appeals formulated its equitable discretion doctrine so as to avoid situations in
which "non-frivolous claims of unconstitutional action would go unreviewed by a court." 656 F.2d
at 882. However, this aspect of the Riegle doctrine is contradictory to the Supreme Court's decision
in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, in which the Court held that "[t]he assumption that if
respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."
418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Moreover,
the Riegle court did not explain its presumption that "a private plaintiff's suit would not raise separa-
tion-of-powers concerns" regardless of the relief sought against the executive branch of the federal
government. 656 F.2d at 881.
60 One other federal appellate court, however, has explicitly rejected the equitable discretion
doctrine. Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 633 (3rd Cir. 1984). Moreover, in its initial congressional
standing decision after Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit itself did not even consider the Riegle doctrine. American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). While Riegle was not considered in this
latter case, the court not only ruled against the congressional plaintiff on the merits but issued its per
curiam opinion one day after the case had been argued. 697 F.2d at 305-08, 303.
61 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
62 Id. at 1170.
63 Id. at 1177.
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rence by Judge Bork, in which he argued that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to sue and that the equitable discretion doctrine should not have
been employed. 64 Judge Bork's position was that the Supreme Court, in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State,65 had "read separation-of-powers concepts [such as those pre-
sented in congressional standing cases] back into that part of the stand-
ing requirement which rests upon a constitutional, rather than a
prudential, foundation." 66 The judge argued that the court should only
recognize congressional standing in cases such as Kennedy v. Sampson and
that "there can be no injury in fact unless there has occurred a nullifica-
tion of a legislator's vote." 67
The D. C. Circuit's decision the next year in Moore v. United States
House of Representatives68 also sparked a lengthy concurrence, this time by
Judge Scalia. In Moore the court of appeals held that the plaintiff con-
gressmen had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a tax statute
but invoked the Riegle doctrine to affirm the dismissal of the action.69 In
his separate concurrence Judge Scalia not only criticized what he referred
to as "the recently devised sky-hook of equitable discretion," but also
asserted that in light of subsequent Supreme Court standing decisions
"Kennedy [v. Sampson] is no longer good law."' 70 Accordingly, Judge
Scalia found the Moore plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.71
Although decided shortly after Moore, it was not until almost one
year after the Moore decision that the opinions were filed in the District of
Columbia Circuit's next major congressional standing case: Barnes v.
Kline.72 The Barnes plaintiffs consisted of thirty-three individual mem-
64 Id.
65 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
66 699 F.2d at 1179.
67 Id. at 1182.
68 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985). Prior to its decision in Moore
the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court judgment that had dismissed an action brought by twenty-
nine Members of Congress challenging the legality of the United States' presence in, and military
assistance to, El Salvador. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aft'd, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). The court of appeals' short per
curiam opinion affirmed the dismissal of the action for the reasons set forth by the district court, one
of which had been the applicability of the equitable discretion doctrine. 720 F.2d at 1357; 558 F.
Supp. at 902-03.
69 733 F.2d at 950-56.
70 733 F.2d at 961. Judge Scalia's particular concern with Kennedy v. Sampson was that the stand-
ing doctrine adopted therein "isolate[d] it from major separation-of-powers concerns." 733 F.2d at
961. In an earlier law review essay,Judge Scalia had argued that "thejudicial doctrine of standing is
a crucial and inseparable element of [the] principle [of separation of powers], whose disregard will
inevitably produce-as it has during the past few decades-an overjudicialization of the processes of
self-governance." Scalia, supra note 6, at 881.
71 733 F.2d at 965. A recent law review case comment has endorsed the rationale of Judge
Scalia's concurrence in Moore, asserting that "contrary to the Moore holding, denial of relief should
have been the consequence of constitutional command rather than judicial discretion." Comment,
Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives: A Possible Expansion of Congressmen's Standing to Sue, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 417, 417 (1985).
72 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986).
Subsequent to its decision in Moore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
had dismissed two other congressional lawsuits. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kel-
ley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan,
738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In neither of these cases did the court of appeals apply the remedial
discretion doctrine. Instead, both congressional plaintiffs were found to assert generalized griev-
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bers of the House of Representatives, the Speaker and bipartisan leader-
ship of the House, and the United States Senate. 73 These plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning a purported "pocket
veto" by the President. 74
The panel majority, relying upon Kennedy v. Sampson, held that all
plaintiffs had standing to sue. 75 Judge McGowan, writing for the major-
ity, also declined to apply the equitable discretion doctrine. He instead
concluded that the case did not present an action "by individual con-
gressmen whose real grievance consists of their having failed to persuade
their fellow legislators of their point of view, and who seek the court's aid
in overturning the results of the legislative process."' 76 Accordingly, the
majority reached the merits of the action, upholding the congressmen's
claim that the act in question had become law despite the President's
attempted pocket veto.77
Judge Bork filed a thirty page dissent, retreating from even his own
previous concurrences in congressional standing cases. 78 Judge Bork
now asserted: "Upon further reflection, it seems to me that not even the
Goldwater 'nullification' test is adequate to the standing inquiry. When
the interest sought to be asserted is one of governmental power, there
can be no congressional standing, however confined."' 79 Bork argued in
his dissent that the notion of congressional standing was premised upon
the assumption that "elected representatives have a separate private
right, akin to a property interest, in the powers of their offices," but that
such a "notion [is] alien to the concept of a republican form of
government."8 0
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit itself subsequently recognized, "The Barnes decision [did] not re-
solve all of the questions related to the exercise of remedial discretion
.... ,181 Or, as a three-judge court within the D. C. Circuit even more
ances insufficient to satisfy article III standing requirements. Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
747 F.2d at 780; United Presbyterian Church, 738 F.2d at 1382.
73 759 F.2d at 23.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 26.
76 Id. at 28. Indeed, the Senate, itself, was a plaintiff, and counsel for the defendants conceded
that the Senate, as a body, possessed standing to sue. Id. at 28-29.
77 Id. at 41.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 68 n.18.
80 Id. at 50. Judge Bork also used his dissent to take issue with the Riegle equitable discretion
doctrine, referring to it as a "lawless doctrine ... [that) makes cases turn on nothing more than the
sensitivity of a particular trio ofjudges." Id. at 61. However, at least one commentator has criticized
Judge Bork's analysis of equitable discretion in Barnes:
The dissenting opinion of Judge Bork distorts the principles of standing in an effort to
preserve the separation of powers and limit the role of federal courts. Such a distortion is
unnecessary because... [i]f carefully defined, the doctrine of equitable discretion may be a
valuable addition to the doctrines of standing, political question, and ripeness already in
place to help prevent federal courts from adjudicating matters better left to the political
arena.
Note, Congressional Standing and the Constitutitonality of the Pocket Veto During Intersession Adjournments, 59
TEMP. L.Q. 151, 189 (1986) (footnotes omitted). But see Note, The Burger Court's Unified Approach to
Standing and its Impact on Congressional Plaintiffs, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1204-08 (1985).
81 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Gregg the court of appeals invoked
the remedial discretion doctrine in affirming the dismissal of the claims of congressional plaintiffs
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recently has admitted, "[I]t is somewhat difficult to reconcile the various
cases on congressional standing in this Circuit, and in particular to tell
which denials of relief in earlier cases, seemingly for lack of standing, are
now to be explained, in light of later cases, as resting upon an exercise of
equitable discretion ....
Thus, at present, the doctrines of congressional standing and equita-
ble discretion remain, at best, in a state of confusion and uncertainty
within the District of Columbia Circuit.83 The argument advanced in this
article is that the doctrines that have spawned such confusion and uncer-
tainty should be replaced by a standing analysis focusing upon whether
congressional plaintiffs actually have suffered injury-in-fact that is suffi-
cient for the purposes of article III.
II. Theories of Congressional Injury and Standing to Sue
In the many congressional standing cases decided by the lower fed-
eral courts, the congressional plaintiffs have advanced three basic legal
theories in support of their standing to sue: (1) standing based upon an
injury derivatively suffered by a congressman due to an injury inflicted
upon the Congress, (2) standing based upon the congressman's status as
a representative of his or her constituents, and (3) standing based upon
an injury suffered directly by the congressman.8 4 The first two of these
challenging the accuracy of the Congressional Record. The Court referred to the "doctrine of remedial
discretion as the preferred method for coping with separation-of-powers concerns in suits by con-
gressional plaintiffs where the ill in question could clearly be rectified by congressional action." Id.
at 544.
82 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v. Synar,
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). The congressional plaintiffs in Synar challenged the constitutionality of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985). The three-judge court which initially
considered the action held that the congressional plaintiffs had standing to sue because they alleged
that "the Act unconstitutionally gives to the Comptroller General and the President formal power to
amend or repeal appropriations legislation that was lawfully passed, and thus effectively to nullify
plaintiffs' votes on that earlier legislation." 626 F. Supp. at 1382. The court also found no basis for
applying the remedial discretion doctrine, because the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act specifically
provided for congressional lawsuits, "thus eliminating whatever equitable discretion might exist and
leaving only the limitations of Article III." Id. Because a private plaintiff who satisfied traditional
standing requirements later intervened in the case, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to con-
sider the standing of the congressional plaintiffs in Synar. 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
83 The contours of the equitable discretion doctrine were further confused by the decision in
Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 766 F.2d 538
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The private plaintiffs in this action were held to be without standing to raise the
same challenge to the composition of the Federal Open Market Committee that congressional plain-
tiffs had attempted to assert in Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997
(1978), and Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1082 (1981). The private plaintiffs in Committee for Monetary Reform argued that, were they found
to be without standing to sue, the equitable discretion doctrine could not be employed to dismiss the
same claim if brought by a congressman. 766 F.2d at 544 n.38. The Court refused to address this
issue, and, in fact, appeared to leave open the possibility that the equitable discretion doctrine could
be employed to dismiss a congressional claim even if no private plaintiffs could raise that same claim.
Id.
However, in a subsequent decision the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia enter-
tained the merits of a congressional challenge to the composition of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., No. 84-1335 (D.D.C. filed June 5, 1986). The court
held that, because private parties would be without standing to bring a similar lawsuit, dismissal of
the plaintiff congressman's claim under the equitable discretion doctrine would be inappropriate.
84 The congressional plaintiffs in the recent Synar case alleged all three of these types of injury:
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
theories provide an insufficient basis to support standing for the individ-
ual congressmen. However, a truly direct injury suffered by a congress-
man can constitute a sufficient basis upon which to premise
congressional standing in at least some situations.
A. Derivative Injury As A Basis For the Standing To Sue
of Individual Congressmen
In Kennedy v. Sampson, the executive branch argued that Senator Ken-
nedy merely had been injured "derivatively" and that only the Senate or
the Congress as a body had suffered "direct" injury sufficient to support
standing to sue.85 The court of appeals, however, rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that while the senator's "interest in the pocket veto
controversy ... is derivative .... it is nonetheless substantial."8 6 The
court held that Senator Kennedy possessed standing to sue because "to
the extent that Congress' role in the government is thus diminished [by
the challenged presidential action], so too must be the individual roles of
each of its members."8 7
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit explained the derivative standing test adopted in
Kennedy:
[I]n order for appellant successfully to employ this technique of show-
ing indirect injury, he must show (1) there has been injury-in-fact done
to the Congress, and (2) that he, as an individual legislator, has been
injured-in-fact because of the harm done to the institution.88
The court of appeals quite correctly concluded in Kennedy v. Sampson
that the mere characterization of a plaintiff's injury as "indirect" or "de-
rivative" is insufficient to defeat standing to sue.8 9 However, the Kennedy
court did not explicitly consider whether an individual legislator may at-
tempt to predicate standing upon an alleged injury to the legislative body
as a whole when that institution has declined to take judicial action
itself.90
"The Representatives allege that these unconstitutional provisions injure them by (1) interfering
with their constitutional duties to enact laws regarding federal spending; (2) causing automatic re-
ductions in their salaries, staff salaries, and office expenses; and (3) causing automatic reductions in a
variety of programs benefiting their constituents." 626 F. Supp. at 1378.
85 511 F.2d at 434.
86 Id. at 436.
87 Id.
88 Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
89 511 F.2d at 435-36. As the Supreme Court has held, "[T]he fact that the harm to petitioners
may have resulted indirectly does not in itself preclude standing." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
504-505 (1975). See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-45 (1976). However, the Supreme Court also has
recognized that the indirectness of injury "may make it substantially more difficult to meet the mini-
mum [standing] requirement of Art. III: to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the conse-
quence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm." Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. at 505.
90 Indeed, in other areas of the law, individuals subjected to derivative injury have not routinely
been permitted to sue. For instance, claims of corporate mismanagement generally cannot be as-
serted by individual shareholders but must be brought as a derivative action on behalf of the corpo-
rate entity. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held, "[C]laims of
corporate mismanagement must be brought on a derivative basis because no shareholder suffers a
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In fact, the courts uniformly have recognized that "members of col-
legial bodies do not have standing to perfect an appeal the body itself has
declined to take." 91 Thus, in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, the
Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of an appeal taken by a single
school board member in an action brought against all the board mem-
bers in their official capacities. 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reached a similar result in Smuck v. Hobson.93 The court analyzed the
problem as follows: "Mr. Smuck has no appealable interest as a member
of the Board of Education.... Appellant Smuck had a fair opportunity
to participate in [the Board of Education's] defense, and in the decision
not to appeal. Having done so, he has no separate interest as an individ-
ual in the litigation." 94 Numerous state courts also have dismissed ap-
peals brought by individual members of public bodies rather than by the
public body as an institution.95
Moreover, serious questions concerning adequacy of representation
may arise if congressmen are permitted to individually file suit based not
upon direct injury to themselves but upon merely derivative injury. In
fact, there often will be situations in which other Members of Congress
may disagree with the position taken in litigation by an individual con-
gressman. For instance, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
nine members of the House of Representatives filed an amicus curiae
brief in the Supreme Court in which they disagreed with the position
taken in the briefs filed by the Senate and House of Representatives. 96
The courts thus should require the Houses of Congress to speak as
institutions, rather than permit each of the individual 535 senators and
harm independent of that visited upon the corporation and the other shareholders." Corwin v.
Bresler, 741 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.
1983); Stevens v. Lowder, 643 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1981).
Furthermore, even while a corporate shareholder in some situations may maintain a derivative
action premised upon alleged injury to the corporation, "various restrictions [have been] placed
upon [such actions] by statutes, rules of practice, and increased judicial recognition of the plaintiff-
shareholder as guardian ad litem or fiduciary for the corporation." H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS
OF CORPOaxrxoNs, § 358, at 1036 (3d ed. 1983). For instance, Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires, inter alia, not only that the shareholder plaintiff "fairly and adequately" repre-
sent the interests of other shareholders, but that the judicial complaint "allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors ... and the
reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." Thus, mere derivative
injury, without more, is not a sufficient basis upon which to premise a corporate derivative action.
91 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1333 (1986).
92 Id.
93 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
94 Id. at 177-78.
95 Ray v. Trapp, 609 S.W.2d 508 (Tenn. 1980) (individual members of election commission and
county court held to lack standing to appeal judgment against those bodies); Elterich v. Arndt, 175
Wash. 562, 27 P.2d 1102 (1933) (individual member of board of county commissioners held to lack
standing to appeal judgment against the board); State ex reL Erb. v. Sweaas, 98 Minn. 17, 107 N.W.
404 (1906) (same). See also In re Appointment of Special State's Attorneys, 42 Inl. App. 3d 176, 356
N.E.2d 195 (1976) (chairman of county board of supervisors was properly denied leave to intervene
in action relating to county budget and had no standing to individually appeal trial court's determi-
nation); Buchele v. Woods, 528 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (per curiam) (three members of
seven member school board were without standing to appeal action brought by taxpayers against all
board members in their official capacities).
96 462 U.S. 919, 929 n.4 (1983).
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representatives to separately invoke the judicial process on the basis of
derivative injury. As the Supreme Court has noted in another context,
"The two houses of Congress are legislative bodies representing larger
constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the ag-
gregate of the members who compose the body, and its action is not the
action of any separate member or number of members, but the action of
the body as a whole ....
It is not unrealistic to expect the Congress or one of its houses to
authorize a legal action premised upon alleged institutional injury in an
appropriate case. 98 In fact, whatever problems are presented by suits
brought by individual congressmen, the courts have entertained actions
"where a majority of Congress approves a lawsuit by expressly authoriz-
ing a member or a committee to represent it in the courts." 99
Thus, in United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit up-
held the standing to sue of the chairman of a subcommittee of the House
of Representatives.100 The lawsuit involved the validity of a subcommit-
tee subpoena, and the subcommittee chairman intervened in the action
pursuant to a House resolution authorizing such intervention on behalf
of the House committee and the House itself. The court of appeals re-
jected a challenge to the congressman's standing, concluding that "[i]t is
clear that the House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory
power, and can designate a member to act on its behalf."'' The court of
appeals' decision thus was analogous to its earlier decision in Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, in which the court en-
tertained an action brought by a Senate Select Committee pursuant to a
Senate resolution. 102
97 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892).
98 Indeed, Congress has established an Office of Senate Legal Counsel, which, when directed by
Senate resolution, is to "intervene or appear as amicus curiae ... in any legal action or proceeding
... in which the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States
are placed in issue." 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (1982). While there is no comparable office of House Legal
Counsel, the House of Representatives and individual representatives have been represented injudi-
cial proceedings by attorneys within the Office of the Clerk of the House. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar,
106 S.Ct. 3181, 3184 (1986); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 922,
928 (1983); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1146-47 (D.D.C. 1983).
99 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 712 n.6 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
100 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101 Id. at 391.
102 498 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, the standing to sue of the committee was not
addressed by the court, which refused to enforce the subpoena at issue in the case. See also Ameron,
Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986) (Senate and leadership of
House of Representatives have standing to intervene to defend constitutionality of statute that exec-
utive branch has declined to defend, but have no standing to obtain an injunction requiring compli-
ance with that statute). But see Reed v. Commissioners of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 277 U.S.
376 (1928), in which the Court affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by senators to obtain
materials relevant to a committee investigation. The Court based its decision upon a finding "that
the Senate did not intend to authorize the committee, or anticipate that there might be need, to
invoke the power of the Judicial Department." Id. at 389.
While Congress can authorize a lawsuit to be brought on its behalf in some circumstances, it
cannot confer standing upon individual congressmen in contravention of the requirements of article
III of the Constitution. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). See also McClure v. Carter,
513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom., McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025
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Moreover, both the special powers of congressmen and the separa-
tion of powers issues raised by congressional lawsuits also caution
against judicial resolution of suits brought by individual congressmen.
Forums other than the federal courts are generally available to congress-
men for challenging executive branch actions. As Judge Skelly Wright
has noted, "[C]ourts could logically afford legislators even less considera-
tion on standing than they afford other citizens, since the legislator's po-
sition gives him special access to the political process through which
general constitutional grievances should find redress."' 0 3 Justice Rehn-
quist also noted the special powers possessed by Congress in his charac-
terization of Goldwater v. Carter as "a dispute between coequal branches of
our government, each of which has resources available to protect and
assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the
judicial forum."'104
In addition to the redress available to congressmen outside the
courts, congressional actions also pose difficult separation of powers
problems. As Justice Powell stated in his concurrence in United States v.
Richardson:
[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-
tenured branch and the representative branches of government will
not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence es-
sential to the former and the vitality crucial to the latter may well
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power
to negative the actions of other branches. 10 5
The growing numbers ofjudicial actions brought by individual con-
gressmen represent precisely the "repeated and essentially head-on con-
frontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative
branches" thatJustice Powell cautioned against in Richardson. Therefore,
the courts should not recognize the standing of individual congressmen
based upon derivative injury. As Justice Powell argued in Goldwater v.
Carter, "[T]heJudicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allo-
cation of power between the President and Congress until the political
branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would en-
courage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek
judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the
(1981) (mem.). Senator McClure lacked standing to challenge a federaljudicial appointment despite
a specific statute authorizing such a suit. The district court concluded that "[t]o allow members of
Congress to change hats, as it were, to plead the unconstitutionality of their own acts before this
court on the basis of an argument already debated in the Senate but lost there by vote would, we
suggest, set a dangerous precedent." McClure, 513 F. Supp. at 271.
103 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc) (Wright, C.J., con-
curring) (emphasis added), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). As one commentator has noted:
Rather than justifying a grant of standing, one may argue that the official role of a legislator
involves sufficient power within the legislature so that no expansion of that power through
the courts would be appropriate; in Alexander Bickel's phrase, the courts should not be a
forum for a replaying of the political game.
Note, Standing To Sue For Members of Congress, 83 YALE LJ. 1665, 1678 (1974) (citing A. BICKEL, Pou-
TICS AND THE WARREN COURT 134 (1965)).
104 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
105 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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opportunity to resolve the conflict."' 10 6 Or, as one commentator has as-
serted, "[A]llowing individual legislators to base standing on injuries suf-
fered by Congress as an institution makes it possible for a legislator to
initiate a court battle with the executive when a political solution to the
dispute is still being pursued or has already been reached through legis-
lative acquiescence."' 10 7
For precisely these reasons, the courts should not employ the doc-
trine of "derivative injury" as a basis for congressional standing to sue.
B. Representational Standing As A Basis For The Standing To Sue of
Individual Congressmen
Although not as commonly asserted in support of congressional
standing as derivative injury, several recent congressional lawsuits have
proceeded on a theory of representational standing to sue. 10 8 In these
suits, the plaintiff congressmen have attempted to predicate their stand-
ing not only upon injury they allegedly have suffered directly but they
also have "allege[d] ... that they have standing in a representative capac-
ity" to assert claims on behalf of their constituents. 10 9 Because of the
general inability of congressional plaintiffs to satisfy the requirements for
representational standing, 110 and the difficulties posed by representative
lawsuits brought by congressmen,"' the courts should not permit con-
gressmen to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of their
constituents. 112
106 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell,J., concurring). In this concurrence, Justice Powell found Goldwater to
be nonjusticiable based upon ripeness, rather than standing, grounds. In the court of appeals, Chief
Judge Wright had argued that the absence of a "constitutional impasse" rendered the plaintiff con-
gressmen without standing to sue: "[A congressman] cannot suffer injury in fact unless Congress has
suffered injury in fact. Congress suffers no injury unless the Executive has thwarted its will; and
there is no such will to thwart unless a majority of Congress has spoken unequivocally." Goldwater
v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, C.J., concurring), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
107 Note, Should Congress Defend Its Own Interests Before The Courts?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 715, 721
(1981).
108 E.g., VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1167 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983);
Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nona., Bowsher
v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); McKinney v. United States Department of the Treasury, 614 F.
Supp. 1226, 1240 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), aft'd, 779 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
109 McKinney v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 614 F. Supp. at 1240.
110 See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
111 See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
112 Representational, or associational, standing must be distinguished from third party, orjus
tertii, standing. While parties have been permitted to raise the claims of third parties not before the
court in certain limited circumstances, "the Supreme Court appears never to have heard a case
where the litigant's only claim is the vindication of a third party's rights." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON.
sTrruTiONAL LAw § 3-26, at 203 n.2 (1978). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Note,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423, 429-30 (1974).
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of situations in which congressmen could satisfy the prereq-
uisites for third party standing. Justice Blackmun has summarized these requirements as follows:
[T]he court has looked primarily to two factual elements to determine whether the rule
[against third-party standing] should apply in a particular case. The first is the relationship
of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert....
The other factual element to which the Court has looked is the ability of the third party
to assert his own right.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
The relationship between a congressman and his hundreds of thousands of constituents is sim-
ply not such "that the former is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the
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Perhaps because of the acceptance of derivative congressional stand-
ing in Kennedy v. Sampson, few congressional plaintiffs have attempted to
sue as a representative of their constituents. 1 3 VanderJagt v. O'Neill 114 is
one of the few cases in which congressmen have attempted to rely upon a
theory of representational standing. The plaintiff congressmen in 'this
action alleged the underrepresentation of Republicans on committees of
the House of Representatives and sued not only on their own behalf but
"as representatives.., of all voters in congressional districts represented
by Republican members." 115 In concluding that the congressmen pos-
sessed standing to sue, the court of appeals considered the assertion of
representational standing: "[W]e are not only dealing here with legisla-
tors suing as legislators, but also with legislators suing as voters and as
representatives of the classes of all voters represented by Republicans.
In that sense, appellants would seem to have strengthened their argu-
ment for judicial review by including 'private plaintiffs' in their suit." 1 1 6
In contrast to VanderJagt, the United States Court of International
Trade rather summarily rejected an attempt by congressional plaintiffs to
sue as representatives of their constituents in McKinney v. United States
Department of the Treasury.1" 7 After finding that the congressmen did not
satisfy the traditional "vote nullification" test for congressional standing,
the court rejected their assertion of representational standing to sue:
"Plaintiffs cannot predicate their own standing upon injuries incurred by
their constituents. Generally, plaintiffs must assert their rights and not
those of third parties."" 8
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of situations in which congressmen
could satisfy the traditional tests for representational, or associational,
latter." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. at 115. Instead, this relationship is significantly more attenu-
ated than that between doctor and patient or between employer and employee, in which situations
the Supreme Court has recognizedjus tertii standing. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). In addition, there generally is no obstacle to the assertion of
their rights by a congressman's constituents directly, and constituents have joined with their con-
gressmen as plaintiffs in some civil actions. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 493 (1969);
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 n.14 (1966).
113 In addition to congressional suits, however, state and local legislators have attempted to in-
voke the doctrine of representational standing. Thus, in Gewertz v. Jackman, 467 F. Supp. 1047
(D.N.J. 1979), the plaintiff-state legislator challenged his removal from a legislative committee. The
district court refused to recognize any representational standing: "We need not reach the issue of
the equal protection rights of plaintiff's constituents, since none is a plaintiff in this action [and]
[p]laintiff himself has no standing to assert their rights." 467 F. Supp. at 1060 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556
(E.D. Va. 1976), appeal dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977) (mem.), the court held that the County
Board of Supervisors could not bring suit to seek redress for alleged constitutional torts inflicted
upon county residents. The court reasoned that the Board "does not have a sufficient stake in this
aspect of the suit to insure the requisite adversity in presenting this action" and "is not authorized to
redress injuries of a personal nature inflicted upon its residents." 408 F. Supp. at 565, 566.
114 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
115 Id. at 1167 n.1.
116 Id. at 1169 n.4. Despite holding that the plaintiff congressmen had standing to sue, the court
of appeals nevertheless dismissed Vanderjagt under the equitable discretion doctrine. Id. at 1175-77.
117 614 F. Supp. 1226 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), af'd, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
118 614 F. Supp. at 1240. In addition to VanderJagt and McKinney, the congressional plaintiffs in
Synar also attempted to assert representational standing predicated upon alleged "reductions in a
variety of programs benefiting their constituents." 626 F. Supp. at 1378. However, the three-judge
court that considered the issue upheld the congressmen's standing to sue without considering their
theory of representational standing. 626 F. Supp. at 1381.
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standing. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the
Supreme Court set forth the following three requirements for such
standing:
[W]e have recognized that an association has standing to bring suit on
behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individ-
ual members in the lawsuit. 19
It would be difficult, at best, for congressional plaintiffs to satisfy all
three of these tests. 120 Initially, in most cases it is unlikely that a con-
gressman's constituents "would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right." To the extent that a congressman attempts to assert claims
as the representative of his or her constituents, such claims "would likely
be of the type 'held in common by all members of the public' and thus
insufficient as a basis for standing."' 12 Accordingly, congressional plain-
tiffs generally will be unable to satisfy the first test for representational
standing. 122
Nor is it clear whether "the interests [sought] to be protect[ed] [by a
congressional plaintiff] are germane to the purpose" of the congress-
man-constituent relationship so as to satisfy the second Hunt representa-
tional standing test. The Constitution provides for the election of
119 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), reaffirmed in UAW v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. 2523, 2532-33 (1986). See also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
120 Indeed, an intitial question arises as to whether representational standing is even available to
congressional plaintiffs because they are not membership organizations. In Hunt the plaintiff organi-
zation was not a voluntary membership organization, but a state agency created to promote the
Washington apple industry. 432 U.S. at 344. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the represen-
tational standing of the agency, recognizing what one commentator has referred to as "equitable
membership" for representational standing purposes. Burnham, Aspirational and Existential Interests of
Social Reform Organizations: A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HAzv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 153, 165
n.49 (1985). The Court noted that "while the apple growers and dealers are not 'members' of the
Commission in the traditional trade association sense, they possess all of the indicia of membership
in an organization." 432 U.S. at 344. The Court further noted that the growers and dealers "elect
the members of the Commission" and that "the Commission represents the State's growers and
dealers and provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their collec-
tive interests." 432 U.S. at 344, 345.
Any attempt by congressional plaintiffs to satisfy the Hunt representational standing test thus
would focus on the fact that citizens attempt to "express their collective views and protect their
collective interests" through their elected representatives. However, courts can be expected to be
reluctant to stretch the boundaries of Hunt to encompass the congressman-constituent relationship.
As Professor Burnham has observed, "courts are particularly reluctant to 'create' a membership
since the only article III injury that will exist in a derivative standing case will be injury to members."
Burnham, supra, at 165 n.49. See also cases collected in Burnham, supra, at 165 n.49.
121 Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974)). See also United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974).
122 However, a legislator's constituents might not possess a claim "held in common by all mem-
bers of the public" if the legislator had been excluded from the legislature. E.g., Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp.
1101 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D.NJ. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 325
(3d Cir. 1976). In these cases, though, representational standing has not been considered because
not only had constituents joined the lawsuits as plaintiffs but the legislator had suffered a direct,
personal injury from the legislative exclusion. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. at 493, 498-500;
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. at 128 n.4, 137 n.14; Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp. at 1103 n.1, 1107;
Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. at 657.
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congressmen to represent the residents of their districts in the Congress,
rather than in the courts. 123 The congressman-constituent relationship
must be read very broadly, indeed, to encompass an expectation that
congressmen will attempt to represent their constituents even outside
the legislative arena.
Even more problematic for any attempt to fit congressional standing
within the traditional representational standing mold is the final Hunt re-
quirement that "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."' 24
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of legislative attempts to invoke repre-
sentational standing stems from the fact that there presumably is a wide
difference of opinion among a legislator's constituents on any given is-
sue. Thus it generally will be impossible for a legislator to represent one
part of his or her constituency in the courts without taking a position that
another part of that constituency opposes.' 25 Because of such conflicts
of interest, representational standing should not be afforded congress-
men seeking to assert the rights of their constituents.' 26
Even if congressmen could satisfy the traditional test for representa-
tional standing, serious separation of powers problems would be
presented by congressional attempts to sue the executive branch of the
federal government on behalf of their constituents. Perhaps an analo-
123 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (House of Representatives); U.S. Const. amend. XVII (Senate). As
one commentator has remarked, "[Tihe fact that a legislator is elected to represent his constituents
in the political sense in the legislature does not mean that he may represent his constituents in the
legal sense in the courts on the same basis." Note, Standing To Sue For Members of Congress, 83 YALE
LJ. 1665, 1677-78 (1974). See also Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HAtv.J.
ON LEGIS. 352, 369 (1974) ("Congressmen should resist the temptation to become public interest
law firms for their states or districts."). But see the concurrence ofJudge Fahy in Kennedy v. Sampson,
in which Senator Kennedy was found to have standing because, inter alia, "[a]s a United States Sena-
tor he represents a sovereign State whose people have a deep interest in the Act [that the President
had attempted to veto] and look to their Senators to protect that interest." 511 F.2d at 446.
124 432 U.S. at 343. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515 (1975).
125 One aspect of this problem was highlighted in the case of Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th
Cir. 1977). In Davids the plaintiff Democratic state legislators challenged the refusal of the Republi-
can Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives to appoint them to legislative committees. The
plaintiffs asserted that the Speaker's actions denied not just them, but those who had voted for them,
the equal protection of the laws. 549 F.2d at 124.
The court of appeals rejected not only the equal protection challenge, but also the implicit
premise of the legislators that they represented only those citizens who had voted for them:
[E]ach candidate elected represents all of the people of his district-those who voted for
him, those who voted against him, those who chose not to vote, those who were not eligible
to vote. He does not represent just or only the voters who voted for him, or those who are
members of his political party.
549 F.2d at 124.
Thus, because the rights and interests of a legislator's constituency are not monolithic, those
rights and interests should not be determined without the participation of the members of that
constituency.
126 See Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979)
(trade association held to be without representational standing to challenge labor agreement be-
cause, inter alia, the "status and interests [of association members] are too diverse and the possibili-
ties of conflict too obvious to make the association an appropriate vehicle to litigate the claims of its
members"). See also Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 10-11 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912
(1976).
Conflicts of interest between a party plaintiff and a third party also can preclude the successful
invocation ofjus tertii standing. See L. TRIBE, supra note 112, at § 3-29, 113 n.2; Stewart, The Reforma-
lion of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1744 n.360 (1975).
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gous area of the law is that presented by a state's attempt to represent its
citizens in a judicial action as parens patriae. "A State [does not] have
standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke ... constitutional provi-
sions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every
American citizen."' 127 The Supreme Court explained in Massachusetts v.
Mellon:
While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity
[of parens patriae] for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with
the federal government. In that field it is the United States, and not
the State, which represents them as parens patriae, when such represen-
tation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter,
they must look for such protective measures as flow from that
status. 128
Because of the separation of powers problems posed by individual
congressional lawsuits challenging actions of the executive branch, 29
congressmen should not be permitted to bring such actions in a repre-
sentative capacity. Instead, as in the area of attempted parens patriae ac-
tions by states, individual citizens should be required to bring any
judicial challenges on their own behalf. If this is done it will be unneces-
sary to attempt to stretch current representational standing doctrine to
encompass congressional lawsuits, while access to the federal courts will
be preserved for citizens whose claims satisfy traditional standing
requirements. ' 3 0
Accordingly, the courts should not recognize representational stand-
ing as a basis for the standing to sue of individual congressmen.
C. "Direct" Injury to Congressmen as a Basis for the Standing to Sue of
Individual Congressmen
While neither derivative injury nor representational theories of
standing are a sufficient basis for the standing to sue of individual con-
gressmen, the Supreme Court has entertained congressional challenges
premised upon injuries directly sustained by individual congressmen.131
However, in recent congressional standing cases, the lower federal
127 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). See also Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982).
128 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (citation omitted). See also Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18
(1927).
129 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
130 In fact, individual constituents should be readily available to join with congressmen as plain-
tiffs. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 498 (1969) (Adam Clayton Powell and thirteen of his
constituents challenged Powell's exclusion from U.S. House of Representatives); Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116, 137 n.14 (1966) (Julian Bond and two of his constituents challenged Bond's exclusion
from Georgia House of Representatives). Cf. Chayes, Foreward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 23 (1982) ("[Iin the vast majority of public law cases, it has been possible
to turn up a plaintiff who has suffered the requisite injury in fact."). Indeed, congressmen them-
selves may attempt to sue in their capacities as voters or citizens rather than in (or in addition to)
their capacity as congressmen. See, e.g., VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1167 n.l (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (congressmen brought suit not only as Members of Congress but
also as individual voters).
131 See infra cases discussed in text accompanying notes 133-40.
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courts have presumed injuries to congressmen due to the deprivation or
infringement of "their" votes in the Congress. 3 2 This section of this
article demonstrates that such a presumption is based upon a mistaken
understanding of our system of representative democracy. Accordingly,
while congressional standing should be recognized where a congressman
suffers a direct, personal injury, alleged injuries premised upon the de-
nial of an official vote are not a sufficient predicate for congressional
standing.
While a congressman may not possess any personal interest in his
own vote, the Supreme Court has entertained actions brought by individ-
uals who have been denied the pay and other emoluments of public of-
fice. In Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court considered Adam
Clayton Powell's lawsuit challenging the refusal of the House of Repre-
sentatives to seat him as a Member of the 90th Congress. 833 While the
Supreme Court considered the justiciability of the action, 34 it did not
specifically address Powell's standing to maintain the action. However,
the record in the case clearly established that Powell had suffered a di-
rect, personal injury due to the defendants' refusal to seat him as a repre-
sentative or to pay him his congressional salary. 3 5
The Supreme Court also has entertained actions brought by United
States Senators challenging federal election campaign statutes 3 6 and a
state election recount. 37 In neither of these cases did the Court explic-
itly consider the standing to sue of the plaintiff senators. 38 However, in
both cases the plaintiffs, as candidates for reelection to the United States
Senate, were directly affected, and injured, by the campaign finance stat-
utes and the state election recount challenged. 3 9
Thus a Member of Congress may suffer direct, personal injury aris-
ing from his or her official position in numerous situations.1 40 The
Supreme Court quite properly has entertained actions brought by con-
132 See, e.g., Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.
Ct. 3181 (1986).
133 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
134 Id. at 516-49.
135 Id. at 493. In its earlier decision in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), the Supreme Court
had not questioned the standing ofJulian Bond to bring an action challenging his exclusion from the
Georgia House of Representatives and his consequent denial of salary as a state representative.
136 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
137 Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
138 But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 12 ("[A]t least some of the appellants [including various
organizations and individuals in addition to the plaintiff senator] have a sufficient 'personal stake' in
a determination of the constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions to present [an
article III case or controversy].").
139 While the congressmen's standing to sue was not directly considered by the Supreme Court in
the above cases, in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court found that the school
board appellants had standing to challenge a state law requiring local school boards to loan text-
books to students in parochial schools. The Supreme Court concluded that the school board mem-
bers "are in the position of having to choose between violating their oath and taking a step-refusal
to comply with [the state law challenged]-that would be likely to bring their expulsion from office
and also a reduction in state funds for their school districts. There can be no doubt that appellants
thus have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of this litigation." Id. at 241 n.5 (quoting Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
140 See supra cases cited in notes 133-139. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), in
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gressional plaintiffs in such circumstances, rather than dismiss the ac-
tions on standing grounds.
This is not to say, however, that individual congressmen suffer any
article III injury-in-fact merely due to an alleged deprivation or nullifica-
tion of a congressional vote. The lower federal courts, though, have en-
tertained congressional claims upon the assumption that a congressman
possesses a personal interest in his or her vote. Thus, in Kennedy v. Samp-
son, the court of appeals concluded:
[T]he office of United States Senator does confer a participation in the
power of the Congress which is exercised by a Senator when he votes
for or against proposed legislation. In the present case, appellee has
alleged that conduct by officials of the executive branch amounted to
an illegal nullification not only of Congress' exercise of its power, but
also of appellee's exercise of his power. 141
Similarly, in framing the issue in Riegle v. Federal Open Market Commit-
tee, the court of appeals stated: "We assume, therefore, that the proce-
dure for constituting the FOMC contained in 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) of the
Act results in a deprivation of Senator Riegle's constitutional right to advise
and consent regarding the appointment of the defendant officers of the
executive branch."' 142 Subsequently, a three-judge court sitting in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia noted: "[T]he
law of this Circuit... recognizes a personal interest by Members of Con-
gress in the exercise of their governmental powers ... ,"143
In contrast to the above cases, several legislative standing decisions
have noted the fallacy of recognizing a congressman's personal right in
the governmental process. In Coleman v. Miller, itself, Justice Frankfurter
took issue with the concept that legislators possess a personal interest in
their votes. Concerning the "procedures for voting in legislative assem-
blies," the Justice concluded: "In no sense are they matters of 'private
damage.' They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative process."' 144
More recently, Judge Scalia used his separate concurrence in Moore
v. United States House of Representatives to make a similar point: "In my view
no officers of the United States, of whatever branch, exercise their gov-
ernmental powers as personal prerogatives in which they have ajudicially
cognizable private interest. They wield those powers not as private citi-
zens but only through the public office which they hold."' 45 Judge Bork
even more recently echoed this conclusion in his dissent in Barnes v.
which Senator Gravel was permitted to intervene and file a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena
directed to his legislative assistant concerning a Senate subcommittee investigation.
141 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
142 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981) (emphasis added). See also
Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878 (referring to "Riege's inability to exercise his right under the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution") (emphasis added).
143 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd sub noma.,
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
144 307 U.S. 433, 470 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
145 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985).
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Kline.146 In this dissent Bork argued that congressional standing doc-
trine is premised upon the notion that "elected representatives have a
separate private right, akin to a property interest, in the powers of their
office."' 147 Judge Bork, however, took issue with such an assumption:
"[T]hat is a notion alien to the concept of a republican form of govern-
ment. It has always been the theory, and it is more than a metaphor, that
a democratic representative holds his office in trust, that he is nothing
more nor less than a fiduciary of the people."' 48
In fact, the Founding Fathers viewed the role of congressional repre-
sentatives in just such republican terms. As James Madison stated in The
Federalist: "It is evident that no other form [of government than one
which is "strictly republican"] would be reconcilable with the genius of
the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolu-
tion; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary
of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of man-
kind for self-government."' 49 The authors of The Federalist also cau-
tioned, "It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in
a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it
may forget their obligations to their constituents and prove unfaithful to
their important trust."' 50
Accordingly, an entire Federalist Paper was devoted to rebutting the
"charge against the House of Representatives . . .that it will be taken
from that class of citizens which will have the least sympathy with the
mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of
the many to the aggrandizement of the few."' 15 1 In order to preserve the
"dependence on the people" of the House of Representatives, the Con-
stitution provided for frequent elections, an extension of electoral suf-
frage that was quite liberal for that time period, and limitations upon the
number of constituents that any representative would represent.1 52
146 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes,
106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986).
147 759 F.2d at 50.
148 Id.
149 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). While the Federalists
stressed the manner in which the Constitution would ensure popular governance, the anti-Federal-
ists criticized the Constitution because it did not go far enough in establishing a direct democracy.
Whereas The Federalist argued that representatives must be able to rise above devotion to
limited local interests, the anti-Federalists were firmly conviced of the opposite. They in-
sisted that representatives should represent local sentiments and speak for local interests;
that they should mirror as precisely as possible the sentiments of their constituents.
J. LEwis, ArT-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 20 (1967).
150 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
151 THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
152 Id. In addition, the requirement that representatives live within the state from which they
were elected, as well as the limited number of electors any one representative could represent, were
perceived as creating a more representative legislative body than the British House of Commons.
THE FEDERALIST No. 56, at 349-50 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
Such constitutional provisions would necessarily operate to counteract legislative independence
such as that advocated by Edmund Burke in his Speech to the Electors of Bristol: "[Ajuthoritative
instructions, mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and
to argue for. . .- these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a
fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our Constitution .... You choose a member
indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parlia-
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The democratic aspects of the political structure of the United States
have greatly broadened since the adoption of the Constitution. The elec-
toral franchise has been expanded radically by constitutional amend-
ments prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on the basis of race1 53
and sex,154 extending the right to vote to citizens eighteen years of age or
older, 155 and abolishing the poll tax. 156 In addition, by the seventeenth
amendment to the Constitution, United States Senators now are elected
directly by the people in the same manner as are members of the House
of Representatives. To recognize any personal interest of a congressman
in his or her official votes would be contrary to these democratic and
republican features of our national government, under which a congress-
man indeed does hold office as a public trust.1 57
Accordingly, congressmen suffering truly personal injury, stemming
from the denial of the pay or other emoluments of office, should be
granted standing to sue to redress the injury. The courts, however,
should not accept allegations of injury premised upon the denial of a
congressman's vote as sufficient for article III standing purposes. In-
stead, such congressmen should be found to be without standing to sue.
III. Congress As A Party Plaintiff
Prior sections of this article have focused on the injuries asserted by
individual congressional plaintiffs. Generally, such plaintiffs cannot sat-
isfy the article III standing requirement of injury-in-fact. In situations
where Congress suffers an institutional injury, however, a suit brought by
Congress would not pose the same practical problems as do actions by
individual Members of Congress. Accordingly, in appropriate circum-
stances the courts should recognize the standing to sue of the Congress.
Judge Arlin Adams of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has summarized the essence of legislative standing doctrine
as follows: "[T]he essential point of these [legislative standing] doctrines
is to encourage political solutions to political problems." 158 Recognizing
ment." E. BURKE, EDMUND BURKE: ON GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 157-58 (B. Hill ed.
1976).
153 U.S. Const. amend. XV.
154 U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
155 U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
156 U.S. Const. amend. XXIV.
157 Apart from doctrines of political philosophy and theory is the question of the extent to which
congressmen actually function as a conduit for the interests of their constituents. One recent study
has concluded that "when 'constituent interest' is given a more appropriate empirical characteriza-
tion than it has had up to now, it plays a far larger, even dominant, role in congressional voting, and
party and ideology correspondingly smaller roles, than heretofore believed.... The tendency for
legislators to shirk serving their constituents' interests in favor of their own preferences (ideology)
seems more apparent than real." Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. &
ECON. 181, 183, 210 (1984). Nevertheless, "[ilt... seems clear that neither pole of [the] dichotomy
[between the delegate and trustee models of representation] is adequate to explain democratic rep-
resentation in the modem Anglo-American tradition .... [T]he proper role of a political representa-
tive today is generally believed to fall somewhere between these poles. ... J. PENNOCK & J.
CHAPMAN, REPRESENrATION 14-15, 16 (1968).
In any event, neither representational theory nor practice supports the premise that an elected
representative has a personal interest in his or her official votes.
158 Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring, in part, and dissent-
ing, in part).
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the standing to sue of individual congressmen runs directly contrary to
this overriding concern for political, and thus non-judicial, resolution of
disputes between the Congress and the Executive. As Judge Adams has
cautioned, "[C]ourts should not cut short the political process by award-
ing a judicial victory to a legislator who has lost, or has not attempted to
prevail, in the political sphere."' 159
An attempt by individual congressmen to invoke the judicial process
is significantly different from the resort to the courts by Congress. This
is so "because the court is being asked to resolve the dispute irrespective
of the existence of political remedies, and without the collective judg-
ment of Congress behind the request.... While the congressional suit is
an institutional decision, the individual suit preempts institutional action,
stifling debate."' 160 Another commentator has cautioned that, "[t]o the
extent Congressmen substitute a judicial forum for the hearing room or
House or Senate floor as a means of reviewing executive administration,
they will drastically alter the character of the legislative process by de-
creasing the necessity for hard political decisions and for interaction with
the political branch."' 16 1
Accordingly, absent direct, personal injury to a congressman, indi-
vidual congressional claims should be rejected. The courts should refuse
to entertain such claims not only due to the absence of article III injury-
in-fact, but also because of the institutional concerns expressed above.
Rather than entertain the claims of individual congressmen, "institu-
tional challenges to the executive should not be permitted without an
institutional commitment to assert the challenge."' 6 2
This is not to say, however, that the courts should not entertain ac-
tions brought by Congress, itself, if it has suffered injury as an institu-
tion.' 63 In his dissent in Barnes v. KlineJudge Bork argued forcefully that
the federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain neither actions brought
159 Id. at 638.
160 Note, Congressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1632, 1648-49 (1977). This
note suggests that lawsuits brought by individual congressmen should be dismissed either as polit-
ical questions or due to a withholding of equitable relief. However, the note proceeds on the as-
sumption that individual congressional plaintiffs satisfy the article III standing prerequisite of injury-
in-fact. Id. at 1650.
161 Note, Congress Versus the Executive: The Role of the Courts, 11 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 352, 368 (1974).
162 Id. at 366. An institutional commitment to assert a judicial challenge on behalf of the Senate
presumably would be asserted by the Office of Senate Legal Counsel. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 288-288n
(1982). One law review note has urged that the absence of representation by this office (or authori-
zation for official representation by the House of Representatives) should be considered by the
courts in congressional standing cases. Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes,
92 YALE LJ. 970, 997 n.94 (1983) ("The Senate's failure to authorize the Senate Legal Counsel to
appear makes absolutely clear that such a suit is brought by a senator in an individual capacity and
not as a representative of the Senate."). See also Note, supra note 107, at 716 ("[O]nce Congress has
established procedures manifesting its willingness to confront the executive in the courts, legislative
inaction necessarily gives rise to the inference that political remedies are still being pursued or that a
political solution has been reached through acquiescence.").
163 In addition to lawsuits brought by the Congress, itself, there also may be cases in which either
the Senate or the House of Representatives have suffered an injury that can be asserted by that body
without the participation of the full Congress. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)
(mem.) (challenge to presidential termination of treaty without ratification by Senate); Moore v. U.S.
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985) (chal-
lenge to federal tax statute because it did not originate in the House of Representatives). See also
Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 194 (1972) (per curiam) (Minnesota
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by individual congressmen nor by the Congress itself.16 However, in
situations in which the Congress, as an institution, actually has suffered
injury-in-fact, it should be afforded standing to sue.
In his dissent in Barnes v. Kline, Judge Bork contended that the ma-
jority's consideration of that case constituted a "rearrange[ment of] fun-
damental constitutional structures." 165 However, at least since Marbury
v. Madison,166 the federal courts have reviewed the actions of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of the federal government, and, in a limited
number of cases, have entertained actions brought on behalf of these
branches of government. 167 Chief Justice John Marshall, himself, wrote
in Cohens v. Virginia that "[i]t is most true that this court will not take
jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdic-
tion if it should.... We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."' ' S
More recently, Professor Herbert Wechsler argued that "[t]he courts
have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to
review the actions of the other branches in light of constitutional provi-
sions .... ,, 169
Indeed, the federal courts have entertained lawsuits brought either
by, or on behalf of, the United States Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. 170 The United States Courts of Appeals for both the Third
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit recently have recognized the
Senate had standing to bring action without the concurrence of Minnesota House of Representa-
tives).
Indeed, there well may be situations in which a "controlling block" of legislators, not constitut-
ing an absolute majority of the legislature, may be able to establish an injury sufficient for article III
purposes. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote
on constitutional amendment challenged by, inter alia, twenty state senators who voted against the
amendment); Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 640 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., concurring, in part, and
dissenting, in part) (to establish standing to sue, "legislators may show ... that as an aggregate they
constitute a controlling bloc of the legislative branch.").
164 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes,
106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986).
165 Id. at 71.
166 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
167 See the Supreme Court cases collected in Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d at 27. See also Ameron, Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986) (Senate and leadership of House
of Representatives have standing to intervene in action to defend statute concerning legislative dele-
gation of congressional powers); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 665 n.23 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981) (plaintiff federal judges have standing to sue Attorney General
seeking injunction against enforcement ofjudicial reporting provisions of Ethics in Government Act
of 1978); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 654 n.1 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, CJ., and Tamm & Skelly
Wright, JJ., concurring), aff'd sub nom., Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) (mem.) ("The Presi-
dent may have standing to challenge a statute which allegedly infringes his constitutional authority
to veto legislation.").
168 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821).
169 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959). But cf.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing for the exercise of a rea-
soned discretion by the federal courts).
170 Moreover, both federal and state courts have entertained disputes between state legislatures
and the executive branches of state government. Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 588 F.2d
265 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Eleventh Legislature of the
Virgin Islands, 536 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1976); Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508,
515-16 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Legislature of the State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669
P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (per curiam). See also Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v.
Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1972) (per curiam); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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standing to sue of the United States Senate.' 7 1 In addition, the Supreme
Court at least tacitly approved the intervention of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha.172 Moreover, in Barnes v. Kline the executive branch, through the
Department of Justice, conceded in the court of appeals that a single
House of Congress had standing to litigate the constitutional question at
issue in that case. 173
As Justice Powell concluded in Goldwater v. Carter, "The specter of
the Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intran-
sigence of the President and the Congress would require this court to
provide a resolution pursuant to our duty' "to say what the law is." ' ". 174
Accordingly, because a lawsuit by Congress or one of its Houses would
not present the many problems posed by the resort to the court by indi-
vidual congressmen, 175 standing to sue should be afforded these institu-
tions if they have suffered injury-in-fact.' 76
Nor does it appear likely that Congress would resort to the federal
courts with undue frequency. One study has found that, despite the
existence of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, "the Senate has taken no
action in at least six cases following notification from the Attorney Gen-
eral of his determination not to defend . . . [congressional] statutes
171 Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986); Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom., Burke v. Barnes, 1906 S. Ct. 1258
(1986). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has upheld the standing
to sue of the chairman of a subcommittee of the House of Representatives and of a Senate commit-
tee, both having been authorized to bring suit by the House of Congress in question. United States
v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Senate Select Com-
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
172 462 U.S. 919, 930 n.5, 939 (1983).
173 759 F.2d at 29 n.16. The Department of Justice also had conceded in Kennedy v. Sampson
that, because they had sustained a direct injury, the Senate or the Congress might have standing to
sue. 511 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
174 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 703 (1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 105-07 and 158-162. One commentator has argued:
[I]f Congress as an institution decides that it can best vindicate its interest in the courts
rather than through conventional political means, the courts should defer to the congres-
sional choice among available remedies. First, the court need not fear that judicial action
will result in untoward intervention into the political process, since the legislature itself has
initiated the request for assistance. Second, the fact that Congress as an institution has
resolved to seek judicial relief means that the majority has been convinced of the wisdom of
the course of action-the political process has not been circumvented or shut off prema-
turely. Third, to require Congress to use its political power in every case is to ignore the
fact that "the legislative route is arduous and time-consuming," and that consequently the
right asserted may prove to be unenforceable as h practical matter.
Note, supra note 160, at 1647-48 (footnotes omitted). See also Note, Executive Discretion and the Congres-
sional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 986-88 (1983). But see Henkin, Litigating the Presidnt's Power
to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT'L. L. 647, 648 (1979).
176 In order to establish standing to sue, Congress still would need to "allege a distinct and
palpable injury to [itself]." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Thus, in Ameron, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 888 (3d Cir. 1986), the court held that the
Senate and leadership of the House of Representatives had standing to intervene in an action in
which the executive branch had declined to defend a statute because of its conclusion that the statute
unconstitutionally delegated executive powers to the Comptroller General. However, the court
found these same plaintiffs to be without standing to obtain an injunction requiring compliance with
the law because "[n]othing in the Ameron controversy gives Congress a direct 'stake' in the enforce-
ment of [the statute challenged]." Id.
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... ."177 Not only have there been very few instances in which the Con-
gress has attempted to resort to the federal courts, but there may well be
a hesitancy on the part of Congress to institute and actively pursue litiga-
tion in the federal courts. As Judge (and former Congressman) Abner
Mikva has observed, "Both institutionally and politically, Congress is
designed to pass over the constitutional questions, leaving the hard deci-
sions to the courts" (presumably in lawsuits brought by private
parties). 178
Under our federal constitutional system, the "hard decisions" must,
in appropriate circumstances, be made by all three branches of govern-
ment. While individual congressmen are generally without standing to
bring such issues before the federal courts, the courts should recognize
the standing to sue of the Congress, itself, when it can satisfy the article
III standing prerequisites. 79
IV. Conclusion
The federal courts should not entertain actions brought by individ-
ual Members of Congress unless the congressmen have been injured di-
rectly. Theories of derivative and representational, or third-party,
standing are insufficient for article III purposes. Moreover, the courts
should not presume a personal injury to a congressman due to the depri-
vation or impairment of an official vote.
The focus in analyzing congressional standing cases should be upon
the article III requirement of injury-in-fact,is ° rather than upon variants
177 Note, Equitable Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 YALE L. J. 970, 984 (1983).
In addition, no action was taken on the recommendation of the Senate Legal Counsel that the Senate
intervene before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Goldwater v. Carter.
Id. at 984 n.44.
178 Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587, 609
(1983). See also McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,
1128-29 (1977) (referring to broad congressional delegations of authority to administrative agencies
"for reasons of internal political maneuver or as an escape from having to stand up and be
counted"). But see the rejoinder to Judge Mikva in Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of
Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707 (1985).
179 Merely because Congress may have standing to sue would not, necessarily, require a court to
entertain the merits of an action that it might bring. "Because courts should interpose themselves in
disputes between the other two branches of government only when absolutely necessary, a legisla-
tive decision to sue should not preclude a judicial determination of either mootness or ripeness.
Rather, the courts should view the fact that Congress has sought a judicial remedy only as evidence
that a suit is justiciable." Note, supra note 107, at 734. The Congress also may be found to have
standing to sue, yet a decision on the merits may be precluded by the poltical question doctrine.
E.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (case brought by
individual Members of Congress challenging presidential treaty termination found nonjusticiable
because it presented a political question); Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1985)
(standing issue not reached because challenge by congressional plaintiffs to international nuclear
fuel agreements dismissed as a political question).
180 By focusing upon injury-in-fact, it is unnecessary to attempt to resolve the recent debate con-
cerning the extent to which separation of powers concerns should be reflected in standing doctrine.
Compare Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26-30 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nor., Burke v. Barnes,
106 S. Ct. 1258 (1986), with Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d at 51-54 (Bork, J., dissenting). Compare also
Scalia, supra note 6, with McGowan, supra note 56.
The premise of this article is that, by focusing upon the injury asserted, traditional standing
doctrine provides an adequate basis to analyze congressional lawsuits. Neither the reinvigoration of
the separation of powers doctrine as the primary concern of standing analysis (as advocated by Judge
Bork and Justice Scalia) nor the adoption of a doctrine of "equitable discretion" (as advanced by
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of traditional standing theory or the equitable discretion doctrine. If the
injuries asserted by a congressional plaintiff are construed consistently
with the system of congressional representation established by the Con-
stitution, most of those injuries simply do not constitute the "distinct and
palpable injury to [the congressman] himself" that article III requires.',,
Accordingly, the courts should not generally entertain the claims of indi-
vidual congressmen, but should only confront the issues raised by such
claims if they are properly asserted by the Congress itself or by a private
individual who has suffered article III injury-in-fact.
As Judge Abner Mikva has observed, "[C]onfrontation with the pol-
icy-makers puts the delicate nature of the separation of powers to great
stress. An independent judiciary can remain that way only if the other
branches accept the importance of its independence."'' 8 2 Or, as former
Attorney General Edward Levi has noted:
Resolution of such disputes [between Congress and the Executive]
provides a kind of certainty. But this is an area of great difficulty, re-
quiring caution .... We are sometimes said to be a litigious people,
but the Constitution, while it establishes a rule of law, was not in-
tended to create a government by litigation. A government by repre-
sentation through different branches, and with interaction and
discussion, would be much nearer the mark.' 83
When considering the standing to sue of either individual congress-
men or the Congress itself, the courts should attempt to preserve and
foster just such a "government by representation through different
branches."
Judge McGowan and other judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit)
is necessitated by such actions.
181 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
182 Mikva, supra note 178, at 610.
183 Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 387 (1976).
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